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Abstract
We investigate the effects of the recently constructed Chinese national highway
system on local economic outcomes. On average, roads that improve access to local
markets have small or negative effects on prefecture economic activity and population.
However, these averages mask a distinct pattern of winners and losers. With better
regional highways, economic output and population increase in regional primates at
the expense of hinterland prefectures. Highways also affect patterns of specialization.
With better regional highways, regional primates specialize more in manufacturing and
services, while peripheral areas lose manufacturing but gain in agriculture. Better ac-
cess to international ports promotes greater population, GDP, and private sector wages
on average, effects that are probably larger in hinterland than primate prefectures. An
important policy implication is that investing in local transport infrastructure to pro-
mote growth of hinterland prefectures has the opposite effect, causing them to specialize
more in agriculture and lose economic activity.
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1 Introduction
Between the late 1990s and 2010, China constructed an extensive modern highway network.
We investigate the effects of this network on China’s economic geography. In particular, we
examine effects on the spatial distributions of population, GDP, wages, and the composition
of output around year 2010. Our investigation focuses on how highways’ promotion of
improved access to regional domestic markets affects these outcomes and how these effects
depend on a prefecture’s location in the regional urban hierarchy. We also separately
consider effects of highways that provide improved access to international markets.
Our investigation faces three main problems. First, answering these questions requires
making causal statements about the effects of the highway network. To estimate casual
effects, we rely on plausibly quasi-random variation from the 1962 road network, a network
that predates China’s transformation into a market-oriented economy and predates reliance
on roads to transport goods between prefectures.
Second, we must measure a prefecture’s location in the urban hierarchy. To measure a
prefecture’s location in the urban hierarchy we define ‘regional primate prefectures’ as the
highest population prefectures within about a one day drive and ‘hinterland prefectures’
otherwise. The scale of this definition, ‘about a one day drive’, is determined empirically
using a technique like those used to test for structural breaks in time series data. We also
examine pure distance based measures.
Third, we must measure the relationship between the road network and market access.
This raises difficult problems for estimation. Theoretically founded definitions of market
access are fundamentally recursive. If improved access to prefecture B from prefecture A
increases the size of prefecture A’s economy, then the converse relationship should also
hold. However, this implies that shocks to prefecture A’s economy affect prefecture A
recursively through prefecture B. This raises obvious challenges for the estimation of the
causal effects of market access on local economic outcomes. This is a natural implication
of general equilibrium, and in theory, can be solved with the specification of a correct
structural model of the economy. Our contribution is to identify important stylized facts
about China’s economic geography that such a model should reflect, and to a lesser extent,
to point out that these facts are not obviously consistent with several widely used models
of economic geography.
We skirt this problem by primarily considering measures of market access that depend
only on the highway network. Specifically, to measure access to the regional domestic
economy, we measure the quantity of highways within 450km of each prefecture; and to
measure access to international markets we calculate the minimum travel time to a major
international port along the highway network. Since these measures do not depend on
economic activity, they avoid the recursion problem. They also measure quantities to which
policy makers can directly relate. Our various measures of market access are sufficiently
highly correlated that we cannot empirically distinguish between the treatment effects of
these alternatives.
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In a robustness check, we report on outcomes in which we use the traditional gravity
measure of market access which we call ’market potential’: the inverse of a travel time
weighted sum of economic activity around a prefecture. Unlike our quantity based measure,
this market potential measure allows connections to larger markets to be more important
than connections to smaller markets. This intuitive property, however, does introduce
the recursion problem described above. We also report on results using a market access
measure derived from a Ricardian model of the sort now common in the economic geography
literature (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016; Tombe and Zhu, 2015). However, since our work
is not founded in that model and we wish to remain agnostic about the underlying data
generating process, this is not the focus of our analysis.
To estimate causal effects of measures of access, we must address the possibility that
regional roads are assigned to prefectures on the basis of unobserved determinants of eco-
nomic activity. This is a conventional endogeneity problem, and for our highway network
measures we address it by relying on quasi-random variation in the 1962 road network. To
avoid the recursion problem, for instruments we rely on the same quantity based or travel
time measures of roads. Because the instruments do not involve measures of economic ac-
tivity, their use resolves the structural endogeneity problem that arises from the recursive
nature of market potential and market access variables. However since, instruments do
not vary with specification, we cannot distinguish statistically between our preferred road
quantity measure of local access and a gravity measure.
Our investigation leads to one central set of findings. Improved access to domestic
markets reduces prefecture population, GDP, population growth and wages paid by private
sector firms on average, although GDP effects are not significant. However, these average
effects mask differences in how roads affect prefectures at different positions in the regional
hierarchy. The negative effects of better access to local markets apply only to non-primate
cities. Regional primate prefectures exhibit positive offsetting effects for populations, GDP
and wages with improved domestic market access. For example, a 10 percent increase in
roads within 450 km of a prefecture city reduces non-primate prefecture population by
1.7 percent but increases primate prefecture population by 1.1 percent. As hinterland
prefectures shrink with better access to domestic markets they become relatively more
specialized in agriculture at the expense of manufacturing and services. These effects
truly seem to reflect a prefecture’s position in the urban hierarchy. They do not reflect a
prefecture’s rank in the national size distribution, whether the prefecture is a nodal point
on the highway network, or a provincial capital. Finally we also look at the effect of better
access to nine coastal ports. In general, better connections are associated with increased
GDP and population for all cities regardless of position in the urban hierarchy.
Our findings suggest that the highway system has a profound and complicated effect
on the economic geography of China. Overall marginal effects involve clear reshuffling of
economic activity to relatively concentrate people in regional primates. With this migration
comes an increase in output in the regional primates, manufacturing in particular, while
hinterland prefectures shrink and specialize relatively more in agriculture.
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As a large, developing market economy with newly constructed infrastructure, cities
and regions in China exhibit the variation required to study the effects of roads on regional
development. While much about China is unique, there seems to be no particular reason to
think our results will not apply to other developing market-based economies. Extrapolating
our results to other developing world countries suggests that expansions of the road network
favor the rise of regional primate cities over smaller cities elsewhere in the developing world.
These results are important for several reasons. First, billions of dollars of trans-
portation infrastructure are under construction or consideration in the developing world.
About 20% of World Bank lending supports transport infrastructure projects, more than
for poverty reduction. Moreover, with almost half of the population of developing coun-
tries now living in cities, and this share rising rapidly, a better understanding of the role
transportation infrastructure plays in urban growth is central for informing development
policy.
Understanding the effects of improved connections between hinterland cities and re-
gional or other centers is particularly important in China. The 2005 Reform and Devel-
opment Commission focused on the development of the road network well beyond 2010,
with investments under titles such as ’Developing the West’ or ’Revitalizing the Northeast,’
while the 12th and 13th 5-year national strategic plans emphasize the development of poor
hinterland regions through a vast expansion in road connections. Our results suggest that
these policies may not help these areas retain population, but instead may accelerate their
decline. While these migration responses may go along with overall welfare improvements,
they are the opposite of what is intended.
Second, to our knowledge, we are the first to provide econometric evidence for an
‘urban hierarchy’ at the regional level. This finding has several important implications for
the study of economic geography in general and transportation infrastructure in particular.
In a seminal paper (Krugman, 1991) and subsequent generalizations (Puga, 1999; Fu-
jita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; see Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004, for a review), the
literature has developed a two area model of economic geography with limited population
mobility between the core (our primate city) and periphery (our hinterland cities) areas. A
decline in trade costs may lead to an increase in core population at the expense of the hin-
terland. The idea in these new economic geography [NEG] models is that there is a home
market effect which can be amplified some by population mobility. With high transport
costs, producers in the periphery enjoy a degree of trade protection which is reduced when
transport costs fall and periphery residents gain by importing certain products from the
core, which they had bought before from local producers. The result is a shift of employ-
ment to the core, so its population and GDP rise. This modeling context applies well to
China. Tombe and Zhu (2015) present evidence of low population mobility rates between
regions in China and while there is greater between prefecture mobility within regions,
migration remains very costly.
Existing empirical evidence on the effects of highways on economic geography in devel-
oping countries is mixed. For China, like us Faber (2014) concludes that rural (periphery)
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Chinese prefectures are hurt by better proximity to new highways. However, Banerjee,
Duflo and Qian (2012) conclude that proximity to a highway or railroad is beneficial for an
average Chinese county. Ghani, Goswami and Kerr (2016) find that India’s new highway
network favored nodal cities while Redding and Sturm (2008) find that small German cities
were more adversely affected by German reunification than large ones. We provide more
direct econometric evidence for an ‘urban hierarchy’ at the regional level, and the contrast
between core and periphery outcomes. 1
Our findings are also relevant for the theoretical literature describing central place
theory. Central place theory originates with Christaller (1933) and consists primarily
of the conjecture that in any given region there should be a dominant city, the ‘central
place’, that produces a full range of goods for sale to smaller more specialized cities, which
may produce goods for still smaller cities in turn. This conjecture forms the basis for a
theoretical literature that attempts to rationalize this geography from formal foundations.
As noted above, Krugman (1991) provides such foundations in a geography consisting of
two discrete locations, while Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999) and Tabuchi and Thisse
(2011) develop specific general equilibrium models of such urban hierarchies along a line
and around a circle.
There is a large literature which takes a different approach to examining the effects
of national transport systems (e.g. Donaldson, 2015; Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016;
Alder, 2016; Sotelo, 2015; Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Bartelme, 2015; Fajgelbaum and
Redding, 2014; Tombe and Zhu, 2015; Balboni, 2017), including an early version of this
paper (Baum-Snow, Henderson, Turner, Zhang and Brandt, 2016). 2 After experimenting
with calibrations of standard versions of these models, we concluded that our results were
not consistent with these models, as we discuss below. Fundamentally, the presence of an
urban hierarchy appears to require either returns to scale that are important enough to
permit multiple equilibria as in Krugman (1991), or else an important role for industrial
specialization that depends on prefecture abundance of land or natural resources (or on an
exogenous comparative advantage in manufacturing and service sectors). The recent liter-
ature generally assumes returns to scale are ‘small enough’ to rule out multiple equilibria,3
while land or natural resource abundance typically plays a small role in most structural
models applied to transportation.4
1Our findings help reconcile apparent contradictions in the literature investigating the effect of roads
and highways in China. Our results suggest these differences are a consequence of sampling. Faber (2014)
deliberately oversamples rural prefectures, while Banerjee, Duflo and Qian (2012) do not.
2There are also papers on the role of transportation infrastructure and trade costs in economic devel-
opment. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) provide evidence that lower trade costs have fostered innovation
through competition in India. Innovative ideas (Alvarez, Buera and Lucas, 2013; Buera and Oberfeld,
2014) are additional mechanisms through which trade may promote growth. Storeygard (2016) and Bird
and Straub (2015) provide related reduced form evaluations of the effects of road networks on cities in
Africa and Brazil respectively.
3For an example of such a condition, see Theorem 2 (iii) and Proposition 1 in Arkolakis and Allen (2014).
4Nagy (2017) is an exception.
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Thus, the focus of this paper is to establish facts about the impacts of the expressway
system on China’s economic geography. Our object is to identify what forces determine the
winning and losing regions from the reshuffling of economic activity caused by an express-
way system. This is critical to public policy decision making and informs the consideration
of modeling strategies that may rationalize our pattern of results.
2 Context and Data
The Chinese context is well-suited for our investigation. First, China is large and geograph-
ically varied enough to permit the emergence of a large number of regional primate cities
and their hinterlands. Second, the policy intervention is enormous. China had essentially
no limited access highways in 1990 and Chinese prefectures experienced large variation in
the expansion of the local network since 1990. In 1990, intercity roads had at most two
lanes with unrestricted access and, in many places, were not even paved. Almost all goods
moved by rail or river, with less than 5% of freight ton-miles moved by road. By 2010
China had constructed an extensive intercity highway network, including the national ex-
pressway system. Construction started slowly, with only a few highways complete by 2000,
but sped up so that a network serving the whole nation and carrying over 30% of freight
ton-miles was in place before 2010, the year for which we generate most results. This
highway construction program has resulted in considerable variation across prefectures in
how well connected they are to nearby hinterland markets and coastal ports.
Figures 1a and 1b show the national road networks in 1962 and 2010. We use these two
networks to calculate quantity based measures of road infrastructure, e.g., kilometers of
roads within 450km of a prefecture center,5 and to estimate the cost of travel between any
pair of prefectures.6 These pairwise cost estimates, which we discuss in detail in section
2.4, are based on estimates of network travel time along the road network travel calculated
assuming speeds of 25 kph on local highways and 90 kph on expressways. The lightly
shaded region in figure 1 is our study area. We use the 285 prefectures in this area as our
primary estimation sample. The unique Chinese historical context allows us to construct
plausibly exogenous instruments for transport networks on the basis of an historical road
network from 1962. We postpone a detailed discussion of our estimation strategy and
instrument validity to section 3.
2.1 Population and Internal Migration
Because prefecture population is one of our outcome variables, it is important to understand
the history of interregional population mobility in China. Before 2000, with the exception
5For the purpose measuring infrastructure, we include roads within China that are outside our study
area.
6We calculate pairwise travel times using the ARCGIS network analyst, which is based on the Dijkstra
algorithm.
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of a few coastal cities, cities hosted few inter-province or even inter-prefecture migrants.
Migration was limited by the hukou system, which regulated and restricted migration
between prefectures and imposed penalties for un-licensed migration. These restrictions
were lifted in stages starting in the late 1990s and by the early 2000s unlicensed migration
was no longer illegal, although the hukou system continues to restrict migrants’ access to
formal housing markets, schools, health care, and social security (Chan, 2005), particularly
in larger cities. For the period 2000 to 2005, Tombe and Zhu (2015) find extremely high
inter-provincial costs of moving, but also very high costs even for within province moves.
Of course there is movement, even if mostly local; and China’s share of population which
is urban has risen to about 50% in 2010 from about 30% in 1990.
Chinese administrative geography dictates the spatial units that we use in our analysis.
Provinces are broken into prefectures and prefectures into counties. Our analysis considers
285 prefectures in Han China, about half the land area of China. We omit minority
areas for data and contextual reasons and one island prefecture. Our study area contains
almost 90% of China’s population. Over the course of our study period, the boundaries
of a number of counties and prefectures changed, requiring painstaking work to establish
county level correspondences over time and time-consistent spatial units. We index all data
to prefectures defined as of 2010.
2.2 Outcomes and Controls
We are interested in understanding how highways influence the spatial distribution of
economic activity. Because models of economic geography typically predict the effects of
trade costs on population, output and wages, these are our primary outcomes of interest.
Specifically, log 2010 population and log 2010 GDP are our primary outcomes, with log
2007 private sector wages as a measure of output per worker. As a robustness check, we also
consider 1990-2010 population growth rates.7 Data quality precludes an examination of
wage and GDP measures from earlier periods, and hence of changes in those outcomes. To
investigate the mechanisms through which roads affect economic activity and population,
we also look at effects on industrial composition in 2008-2010. From NEG models based
on Krugman (1991), as noted earlier, we expect better highway connections to increase
primate city populations and GDP and to reduce that for hinterland cities. The impact of
wages is more ambiguous and model specific. In Krugman (1991) with a perfectly mobile
population, core city nominal wages fall relative to those in the periphery, since reductions
in trade costs reduce the periphery’s price index more. Introducing local housing costs
which rise with population (Helpman, 1998) and with more explicit modeling of migration
costs (Balboni 2017), effects on nominal wages can be positive in the core region.
We use data from the 1982, 1990, and 2010 population censuses to calculate prefecture
population and employment by sector plus various demographic control variables. The
7All of our population measures are based on census data and reflects counts of people in a prefecture
rather counts of people with Hukou registration in a prefecture.
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1990 and 2010 data are 100% counts aggregated to rural counties, county cities and prefec-
ture cities or urban districts. The 1982 data are our own aggregation of microdata drawn
from a 1% sample for the same geographies. 2010 data is from the University of Michigan’s
Online China Data Archive, which covers prefectures, prefecture cities and rural counties.
To calculate industrial composition, we use disaggregated employment data from the 2008
Economic Census. Wage data comes from the 2007 Survey (actually a census) of Medium
and Large Industrial Firms and are calculated as total compensation per worker by es-
tablishment. We also use data on international trade flows to and from each prefecture
derived from customs records.
Figures 1c and 1d show heat maps of 2010 GDP and population respectively, in which
lighter shades indicate higher ranks. These figures show that the more central areas of
the country have greater population and are more prosperous, with the more peripheral
regions less so. One central goal of our analysis is to evaluate the extent to which road
infrastructure has contributed to these spatial patterns of economic activity.
2.3 Regional Primate Cities
To investigate the role of the urban hierarchy, we must first develop a statistical description
of it. We base our description of the urban hierarchy around the idea of ‘regional primates’
and their associated ‘hinterlands’. We define a prefecture to be a regional primate if, on
the basis of 1982 population and travel time over the 1962 road network at 90 kph, it has
the largest population within a 360 minute drive. We choose to measure population and
the road network as of 1982 and 1962 respectively in order to avoid the possibility that
regional primacy responds to highway treatments. We choose the 360 minute scale on the
basis of a ‘structural break test’ that we discuss below. This is an intuitively reasonable
travel time cutoff, as it amounts to about one day’s drive. Regional primates are outlined
in black in Figure 1e. They are spread throughout the country, but cluster in areas with
low road density. Regional primates have larger population on average than other locations
but small prefectures are well-represented. Indeed, 27% of primate prefectures are below
the median prefecture population of 2.8 million. We note that a number of the smaller
primate prefectures are in remote places poorly served by roads. Unsurprisingly, the top
four 1982 population prefectures are all primates.
As robustness checks we consider a related continuous measure of regional primacy and
examine distance rather than driving time based measures to define primate cities. For the
continuous measure, we first identify regional primates as above. Given this classification,
for each prefecture we calculate the ratio of its 1982 population to the 1982 population
of its regional primate. Thus, all regional primates are ranked one, and hinterland cities
receive values strictly between zero and one. This measure refines the regional primate
indicator by preserving more information about the size of each prefecture relative to its
neighbors. For distance based measures we perform the same type of structural break
test to a identify the critical distance for primacy and rerun specifications based on this
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definition of regional primates. In both cases, we obtain qualitatively similar results to the
main exercise.
2.4 Roads and Travel Time
To describe the Chinese road network, we digitize a series of large scale national paper
maps. Using the resulting digital maps, we calculate travel times between each pair of
prefecture cities over the highway network in each year. To understand the potential
importance of links to the international economy, we also calculate travel times over the
road network from each prefecture city to each of the nine most important international
ports, and select the shortest one.8 We rely most heavily on the 1962 and 2010 maps seen
in Figures 1a and 1b.
The paper maps on which our digital maps are based were printed by the same publisher,
drawn using the same projection and have similar legends. To the extent possible, our
data describe consistent sets of roads over time. However, the growth and improvement
of China’s road network was so dramatic that roads that were important enough to merit
inclusion on the 1990 map probably bear little resemblance to roads that meet this standard
in 2010, even if both roads receive the same designation in the legend. Thus, we are
reluctant to exploit the time series variation in our measures of highways. It is this data
limitation together with incomplete GDP information for 1990 that motivate our focus
on cross-sectional research designs. With this said, as noted, we can and do examine
population changes from 1990 to 2010.
The 2010 map describes limited access highways and two classes of smaller roads, on
which we assume travel speeds of 90 kph and 25 kph respectively. This allows us to calculate
pairwise travel times between any pair of prefecture cities and between each prefecture city
and the nearest of the nine international ports described above.9
Our measures of market potential, defined below, depend on iceberg trade costs calcu-
lated from these pairwise travel times. That is, to deliver one unit of any variety in i from
j we must ship τij ≥ 1 units of that variety. To calculate τij , we use
τij = 1 + 0.004ρ(hours of travel timeij)
0.8.
This expression captures both the pecuniary and time (opportunity) cost of shipping and
incorporates some concavity. All reported results are based on ρ = 1. However, because
the transformation from travel time to iceberg cost is necessarily speculative, we checked
the robustness of all of our relevant results to alternative calculation of τij based on values
of ρ between 0.5 and 2.
8The nine ports that handle the largest volume of international trade in 2001 were: Tianjin, Qinhuang-
dao, Dalian, Shanghai, Lianyungang, Ningbo, Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen.
9We use ESRI’s network analyst for these calculations. This software relies on the widely used Djikstra
algorithm to find routes that minimize travel times.
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Hummels and Schaur (2013) estimate that each day in transit is equivalent to an ad-
valorem tariff of 0.6-2.1%. Limao and Venables (2001) find that the cost of shipping one
ton of freight overland for 1000 miles is about 2% of value, or about 1% per day. For
reference, when ρ = 1, our expression for τ requires a loss of 2.1% of value for an eight
hour travel day.
The calculation of overseas shipping costs requires that we calculate the cost of shipping
to the nearest port, and the cost of shipping from that port to an international destination.
Specifically, to calculate τix we use
τix = 1.15τip (1)
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) carry out a full accounting of international shipping
costs. They conclude that time costs are about 10% (Hummels, 2001) and shipping costs
are 1.5% (Limao and Venables, 2001). We treat the cost of shipping from i to the nearest
international port p the same as shipping to any other domestic location.
2.5 Measures of access to regional domestic and international markets
With road maps, travel time to port and pairwise iceberg trade costs in hand, we turn to the
problem of measuring how the road network affects access to markets. This measurement
problem is central to our analysis and raises two main issues. First, we must distinguish
between access to international and regional domestic markets. Second, we confront the
fact that roads connecting important trading partners are more important than those that
do not, but that any measure of domestic access which involves the outcomes of other
prefectures gives rise to a structural endogeneity challenge.
Efficiency km of regional roads and travel time to an international port
Our primary measure of ‘access to regional domestic markets’ is the log ‘efficiency kilo-
meters’ of highways within the 450 km disk centered on each prefecture city. We assign
a weight of one to regular road kilometers and a weight of 9025 to limited access highway
kilometers. We weight limited access highways more heavily in our efficiency kilometers
because bigger roads accommodate more people and freight; the chosen weights reflect a
rough guess at speed of travel along the roads. Regional variation in this efficiency unit
measure is depicted on a map in Figure 2a, while descriptive statistics appear in table A1.
This measure deliberately relies only on the quantity of physical infrastructure and not
on regional economic activity. Since we build infrastructure and not ‘market access’, this
eases interpretation for policy purposes.10
10We note that our measure of efficiency km does not correct for land area. Thus, places near the coast
may have relatively few roads despite dense networks. This may partly explain lower values of efficiency
roads along the central coast in figure 2a. Presumably, the same issue is also relevant for other infrastructure
measures as well.
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Our efficiency kilometers measure is based on highways within the 450 km disk centered
on each prefecture city. We choose 450 km because evidence indicates most domestic trade
occurs over short distances (Hillberry and Hummels, 2003). In robustness checks we show
results for a 300 km radius. In general, our results are robust to different choices of radius,
provided they are small enough to preserve cross-prefecture variation in the measure of
efficiency kilometers. However, we do not have sufficient statistical power to separately
estimate effects of infrastructure by distance ring.
Our primary measure of ‘access to international markets’ is travel time to the nearest
major international port along the 2010 road network. These times are the same as those
on which the calculation of τix is based in equation (1). Note that better ‘access to an
international port’ is inversely related to travel time to this port, so care is required in
the interpretation of regression coefficients. Figure 2b depicts port travel time variation.
To capture both the domestic and international market access components to transport
improvements, the access to international market measure is paired either with local road
efficiency units or with the measure of market potential discussed next in relevant specifi-
cations.
Market Potential
Highways to nowhere probably have different impacts than highways connecting potential
trading partners. Quantity measures of infrastructure, like efficiency km, will not generally
reflect this.
As a robustness exercise, we construct the following traditional gravity measure of







Theoretical foundations for this sort of formulation of market potential include Redding
and Venables’ (2004), Hanson’s (2005) and Head and Mayer’s (2005) adaptations of Fujita,
Krugman and Venables’ (1999) NEG model. These models feature production of varieties
and CES preferences over varieties with elasticity of substitution parameter σ.
This market potential measure has the intuitive property that it weights travel links by
the size of demand in each destination j. We considered variants using different calculations
of travel time, the shape parameter on the iceberg transport cost and measures of output.
However, reported results use prefecture GDP in 2010, iceberg trade costs calculated on
the basis of the 2010 road network and σ = 2. Figure 2c maps the spatial distribution of
market potential.
Note that since our instruments are the same for the road efficiency unit and market
potential measures, we cannot distinguish between them statistically. We prefer the former
for its direct policy interpretation. With that caveat in mind, in the results section and
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Table A4 we also report results from market access formulations based on either the Eaton-
Kortum (2002) paradigm used in, for example, Hornbeck and Donaldson (2016) which
assumes perfect population mobility across areas or the NEG paradigm (Redding, 2016)
with limited population mobility (Balboni, 2017; Tombe and Zhu, 2015). The Appendix
lays out the construction of our measures of market access. A heat map for market access
looks very much like Figure 1c for market potential.
3 Econometric Framework
As we have discussed, Krugman (1991) type models suggest that causal effects of trans-
portation cost changes on prefecture GDP and population differ by position in the urban
hierarchy. Effects on wages are more ambiguous. We estimate causal relationships between
these outcomes and efficiency km of roads and various alternative ’market access’ measures.
3.1 Empirical model
Denote a measure of access to regional domestic markets by Lit, access to international
markets by Eit, and a prefecture outcome by Yit. The main challenge for the empiri-
cal work is that infrastructure measures may be partly determined by some of the same
unobservables that predict outcomes of interest.
The following statement of our estimation problem specifies how use of an IV estimator
may solve this problem.
Yit = a+ βLit + ψEit +Xiδ + uit (3)
Lit = a1 + β1Li62 + ψ1Ei62 +Xiδ1 + η
1
it (4)
Eit = a2 + β2Li62 + ψ2Ei62 +Xiδ2 + η
2
it (5)
It is possible that some elements of uit are correlated with Lit and Eit in equation (3). For
example, more productive prefectures may have more resources to build highways. But
higher productivity also directly generates greater GDP, population and wages. Other
mechanisms such as prefecture government competency may also be a source of important
omitted variables.
Incorporating the equations (4) and (5) into estimation resolves such endogeneity con-
cerns as long as our instruments Li62 and Ei62, which are 1962 counterparts of 2010 infras-
tructure measures, are uncorrelated with unobservables in uit, conditional on controls Xi.
We are careful to use the same instruments and set of control variables Xi across outcomes
and predictors. This allows our arguments for the conditional exogeneity of instruments,
or that E[Li62uit] = 0 and E[Ei62uit] = 0, to apply across our full range of estimation
results. In order to facilitate coefficient comparisons across predictor, outcome and specifi-
cation within outcome, we maintain the same instruments for all road and access measures
throughout the analysis.
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When Lit and Eit are calculated using only information about roads, we face standard
identification concerns about omitted variables that may be correlated with these predic-
tors. When we use lnMPi as a measure of Lit, two additional concerns arise. First, since
lnMPi is a function of Yj for all i 6= j, recursive substitution reveals a structural endo-
geneity problem. 11 Second, because lnMPi is defined in terms of the outcome variable,
we effectively create a system with two structural equations. One describes the way that
market potential responds to Yi and the other describes the response of Yi to market po-
tential. This makes it difficult to evaluate comparative statics. These two problems are
standard in spatial lag models. Under parametric assumptions about the nature of the
data generating process, established techniques exist to recover the spatial lag parameter
of interest β (Kelejian and Prucha, 2010).12 However, standard spatial lag estimators are
not robust to model mis-specification, an essential attribute of any credible analysis. Our
solution is to use an IV estimator constructed using information on the 1962 road network
only.
3.2 Instrument Validity and First Stages
Highway construction is likely to respond to travel and shipping demand. Thus, credible
empirical results require exogenous variation across prefectures in the 2010 road network.
We rely on the 1962 road network as a source of quasi-random variation.
In 1962, roads existed primarily to move agricultural goods to local markets within
prefectures, while railroads existed to ship raw materials and manufactures between larger
cities and provincial capitals, according to the dictates of national and provincial annual
and 5-year plans. Lyons (1985, p. 312) states: ‘At least through the 1960s most roads in
China (except perhaps those of military importance) were simple dirt roads built at the
direction of county and commune authorities. According to Chinese reports of the early
1960s, most such roads were not fit for motor traffic and half of the entire network was
impassable on rainy days.’ Lyons also notes that average truck speeds were below 30 km/hr
due to poor road quality.
The People’s Daily (June 11, 1963) describes a major road building effort undertaken in
the early 1960’s; ’The present effort at building roads aims at opening up commercial routes
to the villages to facilitate the transport of locally-produced goods as part of the policy of
priority given to agriculture. Better roads are being built by provincial governments, but
most of them are being built at local initiative. They are rarely fit for motor traffic; on
11If the market potential measure includes own prefecture output directly, the problem of regressing of
Y on itself is transparent. Excluding own prefecture does not resolve the problem. To see this, consider
a simple case with two observations, MP1 = Y2/τ12 and MP2 = Y1/τ12. Substituting into (3) gives
lnY1t = a+ β ln((a+ β ln(Y1/τ12) + ψE2t +X2δ + u2t)/τ12) + ψE1t +X1δ + u1t.
12Gibbons, Overman and Pattacchini (2015) discuss the pitfalls of using these methods. In particular any
heterogeneity in β would render all parameter estimates recovered using a standard spatial lag estimator
inconsistent.
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the better roads horses and ox-carts may travel; on others hand-carts can be pushed or
pulled by man’ (Lippit, 1966 p. 115).
To sum up, the 1962 road network was not suitable for moving manufactured goods
or people with late 20th century technology. Moreover, it was organized to fulfill the
historical objective of moving agricultural goods from the countryside into the nearby urban
center, and not to facilitate the movements of goods and people that characterize a modern
industrial economy. In spite of this, historical roads provide rights-of-way facilitating lower
cost highway construction over or alongside old roads, all of which has taken place since
1990. Therefore, we expect the 1962 road network to indicate routes where roads can be
constructed at low cost, but that it will not reflect late 20th century travel and shipping
demand.
We use the 1962 road network to calculate two instruments. The first is 1962 road
kilometers within 450 km of each prefecture but outside the boundaries of the prefecture.
The second is the travel time, at 90 kph, along the 1962 road network to the nearest
major international port.13 The rationale noted above for these instruments is based on
the idea that 1962 roads were built for other reasons but, but even low quality ones were
upgradeable to modern highways at lower cost than would be required to establish new
rights of way. As a result of this lower cost, ceteris paribus, locations with more 1962 roads
also had more highways in 2010. We exclude 1962 roads within the prefecture because
we are concerned that serially correlated unobservables may predict a prefecture’s own
1962 highways and 2010 prefecture outcomes. For example, serially correlated unobserved
components of prefecture productivity may have driven pre-1962 road construction and
subsequent growth.
These instruments are only valid if they are strong predictors of 2010 regional and
international market access measures and if they are not correlated with unobserved factors
that predict outcomes of interest. Therefore, it is important to control for exogenous
predictors of GDP and population in 2010 that may be related to the prevalence of roads in
1962. Because 1962 roads were more prevalent in more agriculturally oriented and populous
prefectures, we control for 1982 industry mix, education and population throughout our
analysis.14 Because 1962 roads primarily served as connections from agricultural areas to
nearby cities, we also control for urbanization with 1982 prefecture city population. We
13Changes to the speed of travel along the 1962 network rescale the regression coefficients. Choosing the
same speed for 1962 makes it easier to compare travel times across years.
141982 is the first year for which we have information on these variables. Using the 1982 census as controls
in our regressions raises the possibility that the 1962 road network affects subsequent outcomes through
these controls. For this reason, if 1962 demographics were available, we would prefer them. With this said,
China was relatively static during the period 1962-82. The earliest market reforms (which affected only
agriculture) did not occur until the early 1980s, and economic growth was about half as fast during the
period 1962-82 as during 1982-2002. Thus, our implicit claim that 1962 roads affect post-1990 development
only through their effect on road construction post-1990, and not through their effect on 1982 demographics
seems plausible; China was not changing very rapidly during this period so 1962 roads had limited scope
to affect 1982 demographics.
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control for prefecture and central city roughness to proxy for agricultural productivity. To
estimate effects of shorter 2010 driving time to the nearest of 9 coastal ports, we instrument
with driving times over 1962 roads to the respective coastal port. This requires a control for
distance to the nearest point on the coast. Distance to the coast controls for many things
including access to Eastern non-port cities which are politically important like Beijing. We
note however that if, instead of distance to the coast, we control for distance to the nearest
of these 9 major ports, that removes any power of this instrument. For this reason, we
primarily focus our discussion on effects of domestic road linkages. Finally, controlling for
provincial capital status accounts for the fact that these cities have distinct institutional
and industrial histories.
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the result of regressing the log of 2010 efficiency km of
roads within 450 km of prefecture cities on our two instruments and control variables. In
addition to being a ‘first stage’ regression, one can think of this regression equation as
a highway supply function. We see a strong relationship between 1962 roads and 2010
roads, conditional on controls, with a significant estimated elasticity of 1.05. Conditional
on prefecture area, more populous prefectures had more highways built nearby. The coef-
ficient on prefecture area is negative as expected, with larger prefectures leaving relatively
less residual area within which to measure highway length. Interestingly, larger and more
manufacturing oriented cities had less highway mileage built nearby, perhaps because man-
ufactures traditionally traveled primarily by rail. Prefectures in the West had less highway
length nearby, as is expected given the smaller amount of economic development in these
areas. Results are similar when using larger or smaller distance rings than 450 km. The
result in column 3 for the alternative measure of local market access, market potential, is
also strong, even though the instrument does not contain information on GDP of other
prefectures.
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the result of regressing the 2010 road travel time to the
nearest international port on the same set of variables. The key predictor in this regression
is the 1962 counterpart of the dependent variable but assuming 90 kph travel speeds over
the 1962 network. This variable has the predicted strong positive relationship, with an
estimated elasticity of 0.76. In addition, 10% more 1962 roads within 450 km outside of
the origin prefecture reduces port travel time by 3%. Prefectures further from the coast
also had longer travel times conditional on the road network and prefecture characteristics,
as may be expected.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 1 show that our instruments are strong. These results also
confirm our expectation that the 1962 regional roads instrument predicts 2010 efficiency
km, while 1962 travel time to port predicts its modern counterpart.
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4 Results
4.1 Average effects of efficiency km of roads within 450 km and travel
time to port
Table 2 reports coefficient estimates based on the regression equation (3), in which 1962
counterparts serve as instruments for 2010 efficiency km of roads within 450 km and travel
time to the nearest major international port. We have four prefecture outcomes: 2010
GDP, 2010 population, 1990 - 2010 population growth and 2007 wages of private sector
industrial firms.15 16
We first consider effects of travel time to a major international port, seen in the second
row of Table 2. As expected, the average effect of reducing travel time to a port increases
GDP, population and wages. Results in Columns 1 and 2 indicate that 10% less travel
time to an international port leads to 1.6% higher GDP and 1% higher population. We
also find a positive effect on private sector wages, with this elasticity estimated at -0.04.
Estimated effects of regional road capacity, in the first row of Table 2, are perhaps
surprising because they are all negative. While the effect on GDP is not significant, the
others are. In columns 2 and 3, 10% more road capacity nearby leads to about 1.2%
smaller prefecture population, or has a strong dispersion effect. Without controls, results
not shown indicate that the relationships between regional roads and both population and
GDP are positive, but for growth (where fixed historical conditions might be viewed as
being differenced out), the coefficient remains negative and significant and little changed
at -0.11. That is, higher GDP and population regions had more roads in 1962 and in
2010, but these locations gained less population than otherwise would have been expected
given their other characteristics. Column 4 shows a negative effect on wages. Table A2
reports analogous OLS regressions. OLS results are qualitatively similar to IV ones, but
with smaller dispersion effects.
The control variables that influence coefficients in Columns 1 and 2 the most are 1982
prefecture population and the provincial capital dummy. These two controls have large
significant coefficients in Table 2 and historical evidence indicates that road infrastructure
was historically built to serve agricultural shipments in more populous prefectures and
to connect to provincial capitals. However, infrastructure coefficients are not affected
15We note that the interpretation of regressions of change in population on roads are quite different
from the interpretation of a regression of population on roads. In fact, since the modern road network was
constructed entirely since 1990, variables describing the level of roads in 2010 and also describe changes
since 1990. Thus, formally, by changing the dependent variable alone, we convert the regression from a
levels regression to a first difference regression. It follows that we can interpret coefficients in the two
regressions in the same way.
16In theory our data permit us to do first difference regressions between 2010 and 2000 as well. While first
difference estimation has well known advantages, in practice, this is not possible for us. Our instruments
do not predict the changes in road infrastructure from 2000 to 2010, particularly the travel time to the
nearest port.
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much by excluding these controls in the population difference specification in Column 3,
with resulting coefficients of -0.14 and -0.063 on regional roads and port time respectively.
Results in remaining regression tables have the same controls as in Table 2. We do not
report their coefficients as they follow similar patterns.
The focus of the rest of the paper is to explore these negative average treatment effects
of improved roads. We note that if, in Table 2, we replace log 2010 road efficiency units
with the measure of log market potential, the coefficients (and standard errors) in that row
for Columns 1-4 on GDP, population, population growth and wages are respectively -1.88
(7.76), -7.25** (3.57), -7.54*** (2.83) and -6.66* (3.62). Similarly we can take a measure
of market access from either the Eaton-Kortum or NEG structural literature, decomposed
into domestic and international components as given in the Appendix. While improved
international market access has positive effects in Table A4 Panel B, improved domestic
market access has negative effects which are significant at the 5% level in all columns except
GDP and there it is at the 10% level. These of course contradict predictions from these
models. The key take away is that our road efficiency unit measure is not driving these
negative average treatment effects of improving local market access.
4.2 Main Results: Regional primates, their hinterlands, and the road
network
We now show that effects of improved regional road infrastructure are related to a prefec-
ture’s regional importance. With improved road access, regional primates gain economic
activity at the expense of nearby cities. We show that these effects for primates are not
driven by their provincial capital status, absolute population, or centrality in the national
highway plan. Their position in the hierarchy of regional cities appears to be their key
attribute.
We assign the 26 largest urban centers in 1982 within a 360 minute drive over 1962 roads
at 90 kph to be regional primates. We select this six hour cutoff statistically. To select
this time, we first estimate a series of regressions analogous to those in Table 2 columns
1 and 2 but with the two infrastructure variables interacted with a dummy variable for
prefecture primacy, where prefecture primacy is defined on the basis of a candidate driving
time radius. Figure 3a shows χ2 statistics for the joint significance test of whether primacy
interactions equal 0 as the driving time radius used to define the regional primate indicator
varies between 100 and 600 minutes. When we try to predict prefecture population, the
largest χ2 statistic occurs when this driving radius is 360 minutes, although the value of this
test statistic is close to 12 throughout the 340-440 minute range. When we try to predict
prefecture GDP, the χ2 statistic does not vary with driving radius and is everywhere below
levels that indicate interactions are statistically significant. Regional primate interaction
effects are most important as determinants of prefecture population when the radius over
which ‘primacy’ is defined is 360 minutes of driving time, and primate status is never
important for predicting prefecture GDP. Given this, we organize our analysis around a
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definition of ‘regional primate prefecture’ based on the 360 minute driving time radius.
Below we will also discuss results for a distance based measure of primate cities.
We note the obvious similarity between our method of defining primate cities and
structural break tests. As the radius increases, the risk of missing the actual primate
decreases, yet it becomes more likely that one mis-identifies a large prefecture that is too
distant to exert much influence on the hinterland prefecture. One balances these two risks
at the structural break.17
Table 3 Panel A reports regressions analogous to those in Table 2, but with infrastruc-
ture variables interacted with urban primacy. The negative effects of efficiency km of roads
on population, population growth and wages seen in Table 2 are about 50% greater in mag-
nitude for non-primate cities, with the negative effects for GDP larger also. In contrast,
regional primates experience statistically significant offsetting positive effects for all out-
comes. The first take-away is that relative effects are very different between the two sets of
cities. Second, the sum of primate and non-primate coefficients is positive and reasonably
large in all cases. The net marginal effects for regional primates appear positive, although
the sum is generally only weakly significant.18 In contrast to efficiency km of roads within
450km, we do not estimate any statistically significant differential effects of port access for
regional primates except for private firm wages.
As a robustness check, we also consider the continuous measure of regional primacy
status defined earlier. Recall that this indicator is defined for each prefecture by taking the
ratio of its 1982 population to that of its regional primate. Panel B of Table 3 shows results
analogous to those for our regional primate indicator presented in Panel A. These results
are compelling. The nearer is a prefecture’s population to that of its regional primate, the
more the negative effects of being a hinterland city are offset. Prefectures that are small
relative to their regional primate experience significant negative effects for all scale and
productivity measures examined. Interaction terms for the continuous primacy variable
are positive and highly significant for GDP and population.
Table 3 indicates that regional primates are affected differently by regional roads than
are hinterland prefectures. However, evidence on differential effects of port connections is
not present in 3 of the 4 cases in Panel A, though Panel B exhibits some weakly significant
differentials. Taken together, this suggests that regional primates are less affected by the
cost of trucking goods to international markets than are hinterland prefectures. Section
4.4 provides some corroborating evidence.
Results in Table 3 are based on our preferred measures of transport from Table 2. We
offer three robustness checks in Table 4. First in Panel A, we present corresponding results
using market potential as the measure of local access. Results on differential effects for
regional primates are similar to those in Table 3, except of course coefficients are rescaled
to reflect the differences in units of measure. In particular, since the standard deviation
17We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this intuition.
18For example for GDP and population, Chi-sq statistics are 2.95 and 2.12 which for a one tail test have
p-values of of 0.086 and 0.145 respectively.
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of market potential is much smaller than that of efficiency roads, coefficients for market
potential measures tend to be larger. Then Panel B returns to road efficiency units within
450 km, but uses a primacy measure based on being the primate city within a certain
distance (rather than driving time over 1962 roads). As shown in Figure 3b, the structural
break here for both GDP and population appears to be at a distance of about 420 km, with
just 9 regional primates emerging. The results in Panel B are very strong for GDP and
population. For hinterland cities, more efficiency units result in losses in all cases, which
are all significant except for GDP. Differentials for this more restricted set of primates for
GDP, population and population growth are now very large with significant positive net
marginal effects for these three outcomes. In Panel C we limit the road efficiency unit
measure to roads within 300km rather than 450km. Results are qualitatively similar to
those in Table 3.
4.3 Primacy versus absolute size, political status, and transport node
Our definition of regional primates was motivated by ideas from central place theory.
Here we show that our definition is the one for which heterogeneous effects matter; other
definitions of regional importance do not exhibit similar heterogeneous effects. Table 5
reports results analogous to those in Table 3 but with a different primacy definition in each
panel.
In Panel A, we look at nodal cities in the ”5-7” highway plan from the early 1990s.
These are cities in which various highways were planned to converge, and thus were viewed
as nationally important by the central government at the time. Within our sample there
are 38 nodal cities, of which 7 are also regional primates. In Panel B, we look at the
29 top decile population prefecture cities in 1982, of which 7 overlap with our primate
definition. In Panel C, we look at 24 provincial capitals, of which 7 are also regional
primates. (The sets of 7 regional primates that overlap in each of Panels A-C are not the
same across panels.) In Panel D, we just look at the 17 provincial capitals that are not
regional primates.
Table 5 presents strong evidence that regional hierarchies matter for regional infras-
tructure effects, even when accounting for other variables that may be correlated with such
primacy. Nodal cities show interaction effects that are all near 0 (Panel A). If anything,
high population cities are more disadvantaged by an improvement in regional road capac-
ity than other cities (Panel B). Only in Panel C is there a hint that provincial cities are
different from other cities. All differential effects for provincial cities in Panel C are pos-
itive, though only that in the population difference specification is marginally significant.
Panel D shows that these positive interaction effects for regional roads are generated by
the handful of regional primates in the group. We find no significant effects of regional
roads for provincial capitals that are not primates.
Our primacy definition is motivated by models that think about interregional rather
than international trade linkages. It is thus sensible that regional primate results for effects
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of port connections are less clear than for effects of regional roads. Evidence in Table 5
consistently shows relatively large interactions between port travel time and the various
measures of regional prefecture importance considered. These interaction coefficients are
statistically significant for provincial capitals that are not primates by our definition. This
is evidence that nationally important cities have better access to international markets
than do other locations, access that depends less on their links through road system. As
such, it is not so clear if primacy or some other correlated attribute is driving differential
effects of port access.
4.4 Sector-Specific Effects Through the Hierarchy
We expect sectoral differences in responses to a better regional road network. For example,
hinterland producers of traded goods with low land shares, high fixed costs, or that benefit
more from agglomeration economies are arguably more likely to depart for larger cities or
go out of business once the hinterlands become better connected. Traded services (finance,
insurance, real estate and business services) and many manufacturing goods have these
features, as in the Krugman (1991) model. Agriculture has a high land share and so
seems likely to respond in the opposite way. That is, hinterland areas should become more
specialized in agriculture with a better regional road network. Non-traded services may
not respond to the regional road network, except through general equilibrium effects on
local demand. Conditional on domestic linkages, improved international market linkages
may have more complicated effects that depend on aggregate conditions in these different
sectors. Using employment data by sector, we verify the expected signs of these responses
and measure magnitudes.
Using the same regression specification and primacy definition as in Table 3, Table 6
estimates the effects of greater regional road capacity and better port access on prefecture
employment by industry. The first column shows that estimated effects on total employ-
ment, from the 2010 population census, are similar to the population effects reported in
Table 3 Columns 2 and 3. Subsequent columns decompose these total employment effects
into impacts on employment in agriculture, manufacturing, traded services and non-traded
services.
In contrast with total employment, the effects of regional roads on agricultural employ-
ment are positive for primates and non-primates alike. 10% more roads leads to 4% more
agricultural employment. Moreover, access to ports is negatively related to agricultural
employment with a 10% greater port travel time leading to 1% more agricultural employ-
ment. This reflects substitution with more trade-oriented products. In Column 3 we see
that, like total employment, manufacturing employment responds positively to roads, but
is more sensitive. Negative employment effects for regional non-primates of -0.35 contrast
with net positive effects for primates of 0.22. While traded services (finance, insurance,
real estate and business services) respond like manufacturing to roads, non-traded services
have 0 estimated effects of regional roads for primates and non-primates alike. Port ac-
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cess positively affects manufacturing employment in non-regional primates only. Traded
services are more greatly affected by port access than non-traded services.
Results in Table 6 Panel B show qualitatively similar results as in Panel A when primacy
is defined continuously, with one exception. When primacy is defined continuously, we
find that traded and non-traded service employments in regional primates do not benefit
from better port access. Effects of both domestic and international road access vary as
functions of prefectures’ locations in regional hierarchies for employment in all sectors
except agriculture.
4.5 Openness to trade and rail
Our study period also saw a dramatic increase in the extent to which China was open to
trade with the rest of the world. Given this, we are concerned that increased openness to
trade may partly explain our results. To address this issue, we assemble data identifying all
prefecture cities that contained Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1995. These zones are
designated parts of cities which enjoy a relaxed regulatory environment and, sometimes,
favorable tax treatment. They are intended to attract foreign direct investment and to
stimulate exports.19 In short, prefectural cities containing and SEZ are particularly open
to trade .
In order to assess the role of China’s increasing openness to trade on our findings,
Appendix Table A5 replicates the results of Table 3, panel A, while adding an indicator
for SEZ status and the interaction of this indicator with the indicator for regional primate
status. The SEZ indicator is highly significant and has the expected positive effect on
output and population, while the interaction of SEZ status and primate status is not
distinguishable from zero. Comparing with panel A of table 3, we see that including these
two controls for SEZ status does not qualitatively affect our main results. Indeed, most
coefficients in table 3 panel A change minimally and all by well under a standard error
with the addition of the SEZ variables. This suggests that our main results are not driven
primarily by changes in China’s openness to trade.
While we have not discussed it, rail is also an important component of China’s trans-
portation network. While we have the same overtime detailed coverage of rails, the rail
data do not account well for changes in rails such as the extension to double tracking, and
perhaps the de facto closing of lines.20 We have experimented widely with specifications
that include measures of the rail network. These investigations have largely failed to reveal
robust patterns in the data. We believe that this reflects the fact that regression speci-
fications like our main specification (3)-(5) are simply too complicated when augmented
with equations for rail, and that measures of the rail network and the road network are
often highly correlated. This leaves open the possibility that some results may confound
19Our data on SEZs comes from the official website of China’s Association of Devlopment Zones,
(www.cadz.org.cn)
20Our rail data are described in a companion paper, Brandt et al. (2017)
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the effects of roads and railroads, though resolving this issue seems to be beyond the reach
of our current data and research design.
5 Counterfactual Prefecture Populations Absent Highways
Our final exercise is to examine the cross-sectional distribution of population absent the
highway infrastructure built since 1990. We consider the hypothetical reduction of highway
speeds to 25 kph, calculate the implied population change for each prefecture, and then
adjust each prefecture’s population by a constant to equalize initial and final aggregate
populations. Since aggregate GDP cannot be assumed constant under counterfactual road
networks, we do not consider the corresponding exercise for GDP.
Table 7 shows the results. Column 1 shows actual minus counterfactual populations
that result from setting all highway speeds to 25 kph. In practice, this amounts to giving
expressways a weight of 1 rather than 90/25 in the efficiency km calculation. Column 2
shows analogous results from setting port travel speeds to 25 kph. Column 3 shows results
of both exercises simultaneously, normalizing the resulting nationwide aggregate population
change to 0. The normalization procedure rescales the population of each prefecture by∑
N2010j∑
Npj
, where Npj is the regression predicted population in prefecture j, to result in no
change in aggregate national population. Results in Columns 1 and 2 are not normalized
to sum to 0.
We see in the second row that primates experience population losses because of re-
duced regional highway speeds. When added to the predicted losses from reducing port
access, the empirical model suggests very large population losses for primate prefectures if
the expressway system had never been built. In contrast, the empirical model generates
small predicted population increases in non-primate prefectures, with the positive effect of
reduced regional expressways being substantially offset by losses from reduced access to
international ports. Figure 4 provides visualizations of these population results with and
without differential effects for primate cities.
If we think of the counterfactual as offering up the effects from building the expressway
system, ceteris paribus, we can compare the numbers with true population changes, nor-
malized to be comparable to column 3. Actual normalized changes are a 337,500 average
increase for primates and a 34,000 loss for non-primates. The counterfactual exercise has
much greater magnitudes: a gain of 1.2 million for primates from building the system,
with non-primates losing on average 121,000, ceteris paribus. This difference suggests that
building expressways was just one of many changes in this dynamic 20 years for China,




The Chinese national highway system has had surprisingly complex effects on the economic
geography of China.
Highways that affect access to regional domestic markets, on average, decrease prefec-
ture population and economic activity. These averages reflect heterogeneity in the way that
highways affect prefectures at different ranks in the regional hierarchy. Regional primates
in the center of a dense regional highway network are larger, grow faster, produce more
and have higher private sector wages. Regional primates in the center of a dense regional
highway network also become relatively specialized in business services and manufacturing,
at the expense of agriculture.
Hinterland prefectures in the center of a dense network of highways experience approx-
imately opposite effects. They are smaller, grow more slowly, have less economic output
and lower private sector wages. These prefectures also become relatively more specialized
in agriculture at the expense of manufacturing and traded services.
Access to international markets affects primate and hinterland prefectures in about
the same way, although point estimates suggest that primate prefectures are usually less
affected by access to international markets than are their hinterlands.
Our conclusions are limited in one important way. Our reduced form methodology
identifies the way that highways affect one prefecture relative to another. To the extent
that highways contribute to the growth of all prefectures, this is invisible to our regressions.
For the purposes of understanding how population shifts from one region to another this
is probably not important. However Chinese real GDP per person increased by about a
factor of four during our study period. Understanding the role that roads and highways
played in this process remains an important question. Purely empirical approaches to this
question probably require country level variation in highways and economic activity, and the
obstacles to collecting such data and obtaining causal estimates appear formidable. Given
this, it seems likely that our understanding of the relationship between transportation
infrastructure and the country wide level of economic activity will ultimately rely heavily
on theory. Our results also shed some light on the development of such a theory.
Several of our findings noted in the text and highlighted in appendices suggest that stan-
dard models based on simple formulations of Ricardian or NEG foundations probably fail
to provide a reasonable description of how transportation infrastructure affects economic
geography and thus do not provide a basis for estimating how transportation networks
affect aggregate economic activity in China. In particular, opposite signs of domestic and
international components of market access (reported in Appendix Table A4) seem hard to
reconcile with the underlying theory, as does the heterogeneity in how access to markets
affects primate versus hinterland prefectures. Finally, central to our investigation is the
role of quasi-random variation in establishing causal effects. Fundamentally, this reflects
the fact that roads and highways are assigned to pairwise links on the basis of the gains
from these links. This important relationship is missing from standard models and, to the
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best of our knowledge, from all extant models of economic geography based on Ricardian
or NEG foundations.
With this said, our findings suggest Chinese highways do allow regions to specialize and
pursue their comparative advantages. In particular, prefectures where land is abundant,
i.e., hinterland prefectures, become more specialized in agriculture, while more centrally
located prefectures specialize in manufactured goods for regional consumption. Urban
hierarchies appear to be of first order importance to understanding how transportation
infrastructure affects economic geography. This suggests that attempts to value trans-
portation infrastructure on the basis of models that do not explicitly deal with the urban
hierarchy, the construction of transportation infrastructure and the importance of land
endowments should be regarded with suspicion. It also suggests that the development of
models with such features should be a fruitful area for further research.
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Appendix A. Structural Market Access in Reduced Form Regressions
Changing trade costs between any two cities may affect trade flows between other pairs
of cities. Neither efficiency km of roads within 450 km nor market potential will vary
with such indirect effects. This raises the possibility that reduced form estimates based on
efficiency km of roads or market potential may not detect important general equilibrium
effects of the highway network.
To address this possibility, we can adapt the Ricardian and ‘New Economic Geography’
(NEG) structural models to recover an empirical measure of ‘market access’. Ricardian
models in Hornbeck and Donaldson (2016), Alder (2015) and Bartelme (2015) and NEG
models in Redding (2016) and Balboni (2017) all deliver such a measure. Full derivation
of the variants of market access we use here is in Baum-Snow et al (2016). This derivation
is done in the context of a standard Ricardian model (Eaton and Kortum, 2002) that fol-
lows closely from Hornbeck and Donaldson (2016); we also note that a similarly structured
equation arises in NEG models. We use this model to describe trade between the 285 pre-
fectures in our study area plus ‘the rest of the world’. Subscripts i and j index prefectures,
and for trade flows, i generally indicates product origin and j destination and subscript x
indicates rest of the world. Yi denotes city output or GDP and τij is pairwise transport
cost as defined above. Finally, θ is the dispersion parameter from Frechet distributed pro-
ductivity draws, which determines the gains from trade between prefectures, with larger
values of θ indicating smaller gains from trade.
For the purposes of the reduced form empirics in this paper, the following expression























is the value of exports.
Equation (6) defines market access with a recursive equation, and given data on Yi, τij
and E and calibration of θ, we can solve this system of equations for MA. We refer to
the first term in equation (6) as ‘domestic market access’, the second as ‘external market
access’ and the sum of these components as ‘total market access’ or just ‘market access’.
Substituting the definition of E into equation (6) shows that the rest of the world is treated
symmetrically with the other 285 trading units, in the sense that ‘the rest of the world’ is
indistinguishable from a large remote domestic unit.
This notion of market access captures three intuitive features of the relationship between
trade, output and distance. First, market access is increasing in the income of potential
trading partners. Second, it is decreasing in the cost of moving goods between trading
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partners. Third, market access is decreasing in the extent to which potential trading
partners have better access to competing trading partners.
To calculate market access, we solve equation (6) numerically using the observed value
of Chinese exports E, GDP in 2010 Yj , pairwise transportation costs τij , and set θ = 5 to
obtain 285 values of MAi and MAx.
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In a Ricardian framework with perfect population mobility, increases in total market
access increase both GDP and population, so signs on market access in regression equa-
tions as in Table A4, Panel A for population and GDP should be positive. In Table A4
Panel B, we split overall market access into its domestic and external components. Given
structural equations with unified market access, coefficients on market access components
are predicted to be scaled by the share of that component in total market access. Given
summary statistics in Table A1, the model predicts about 70% of the total market access
effect should be domestic with the remaining 30% external.22 Evidence in Table A4 Panel
B contravenes this prediction. Domestic market access effects are zero to negative whereas
external market access effects are universally positive.
In China, the hukou system is known to constrain mobility. In Baum-Snow et al (2016),
following Redding (2016) and Balboni (2017), we relax assumptions of perfect competition,
constant returns to scale and free mobility by adopting standard NEG fundamentals. Like
our Ricardian model, the consumption side of the NEG model also features CES preferences
over varieties. But unlike the Ricardian model, the NEG model has internal increasing
returns to scale, with labor as the only factor of production. In addition, the model features
monopolistic competition and local housing as an element of consumption. Finally, this
model allows for imperfect mobility. Mobility frictions are generated by i.i.d. Fréchet
”amenity” draws for each location in which prefecture shift parameters capture variation
in the distribution of amenity levels, as in the extended Ricardian framework specified
above. These NEG foundations with θ replaced by 1 − σ , where σ is the elasticity of
substitution in consumption, imply the same expression for market access as in equation
(6). They also imply a positive constant elasticity relationship between wages (rather than
population or GDP) and market access. Again the results on wages in Table A4 do not
yield the predicted results on market access.
21We experimented with values of θ ranging from 3 to 10. None of the results we report is sensitive to
variation of θ in this range.
22From equation (6), market access is the sum of a domestic and international component. Decomposing
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Log 2010 Road Log 2010 Log 2010
Efficiency Units Time to Market Potential
within 450km Nearest Port Gravity
(1) (2) (3)
Instruments
Log 1962 Roads Within 1.05*** -0.26** 0.018***
   450km, Excluding Own Pref (0.038) (0.13) (0.0017)
Log 1962 Minimum Port Travel -0.024*** 0.76*** -0.00036
   Time Given Road Upgrades (0.0080) (0.061) (0.00030)
Controls
Log Prefecture Area, 2005 -0.052*** -0.053 -0.0029***
(0.019) (0.054) (0.00078)
Log Central City Area, 1990 0.0055 0.031 -0.000089
(0.012) (0.051) (0.00048)
Log Central City Population, -0.026* -0.0076 -0.0012**
      1982 (0.015) (0.071) (0.00058)
Log Central City Roughness -0.0060 0.041 0.00011
(0.0097) (0.050) (0.00036)
Log Prefecture roughness -0.019** -0.040 -0.00044
(0.0093) (0.036) (0.00031)
Provincial Capital 0.066* 0.048 0.0013
(0.038) (0.12) (0.0013)
Log Prefecture Population, 0.071*** 0.017 0.0033***
      1982 (0.023) (0.081) (0.00087)
Share Prefecture Population -0.78** -1.27 -0.013
   with High School, 1982 (0.32) (0.98) (0.010)
Share Prefecture Population -0.25 -0.52 0.0016
   in Manufacturing, 1982 (0.16) (0.58) (0.0047)
Log km to Coast 0.0030 0.055* -0.00053**
(0.0068) (0.028) (0.00026)
West Region -0.25*** 0.054 -0.0045***
(0.031) (0.087) (0.0011)
East Region -0.014 -0.17 0.00091
(0.023) (0.11) (0.00080)
Constant 1.03*** 3.82** 12.8***
(0.37) (1.53) (0.017)
R-squared 0.90 0.88 0.74
Notes: Each regression has 285 observations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: First Stage Regressions
Log Prefecture Log Prefecture Prefecture Pop Log Private Firm
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Gr. Rate 1990-2010 Wage 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infrastructure Variables
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.032 -0.12** -0.13*** -0.11*
   Units within 450 km (0.13) (0.059) (0.045) (0.061)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.16** -0.098* -0.068** -0.042**
   Travel Time (0.066) (0.052) (0.028) (0.018)
Controls
Log Prefecture Area, 2005 -0.041 -0.059** -0.053** -0.065**
(0.061) (0.029) (0.026) (0.031)
Log Central City Area, 1990 -0.10** -0.032 -0.024 0.023
(0.049) (0.026) (0.016) (0.019)
Log Central City Population, 0.11** 0.023 0.024 0.020
      1982 (0.054) (0.025) (0.018) (0.028)
Log Central City Roughness -0.050 0.0013 0.0020 0.037**
(0.033) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
Log Prefecture roughness -0.022 0.00026 0.0031 0.013
(0.028) (0.012) (0.0094) (0.014)
Provincial Capital 0.65*** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.16**
(0.11) (0.051) (0.038) (0.069)
Log Prefecture Population, 0.56*** 0.83*** -0.094*** 0.041
      1982 (0.090) (0.053) (0.032) (0.040)
Share Prefecture Population, 0.51 -0.19 -0.33 -0.58
   with High School, 1982 (0.92) (0.42) (0.34) (0.55)
Share Prefecture Population, 1.98*** -0.38 -0.024 0.55**
   in Manufacturing, 1982 (0.54) (0.37) (0.22) (0.23)
Log km to Coast -0.021 -0.0087 -0.0046 -0.014
(0.034) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
West Region -0.083 -0.0065 -0.012 0.0077
(0.10) (0.043) (0.035) (0.053)
East Region 0.16* -0.045 -0.028 0.086*
(0.083) (0.045) (0.030) (0.045)
Constant -0.59 5.25*** 3.69*** 10.6***
(2.03) (1.40) (0.83) (0.78)
Table 2: Baseline Infrastructure Regressions
Notes: Regressions in columns 1-3 have 285 observations and that in column 4 has 283 observations. First stage
regressions are in Table 1. Kleibergen-Paap first stage F statistics are 236 in 1-3 and 237 in 4. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. 
Log Prefecture Log Prefecture Prefecture Pop Gr. Log Private Firm
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Rate 1990-2010 Wage 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.13 -0.17** -0.17*** -0.16**
   Units within 450 km (0.14) (0.071) (0.051) (0.065)
X Primate Prefecture 0.44** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.25**
(0.18) (0.089) (0.072) (0.12)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.18** -0.11* -0.074** -0.033*
   Travel Time (0.075) (0.061) (0.033) (0.020)
X Primate Prefecture 0.079 0.033 0.010 -0.054*
(0.076) (0.047) (0.028) (0.030)
Primate Prefecture -5.13** -3.07*** -2.60*** -2.38*
(2.20) (1.13) (0.85) (1.34)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.34* -0.34*** -0.29*** -0.27***
   Units within 450 km (0.18) (0.10) (0.073) (0.093)
X Primate Prefecture 0.53** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.20
(0.23) (0.12) (0.091) (0.12)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.31** -0.23** -0.15*** -0.033
   Travel Time (0.13) (0.11) (0.054) (0.034)
X Primate Prefecture 0.26* 0.22* 0.13** -0.010
(0.15) (0.12) (0.059) (0.040)
Primate Prefecture -7.35*** -5.99*** -4.31*** -2.23*
(2.83) (1.80) (1.13) (1.33)
Table 3: Infrastructure Effects with Primate Prefecture Interactions
Notes: Each regression has the same set of control variables as in Table 2. Regressions in columns 1-3 have 285
observations and that in column 4 has 283 observations. The Kleibergen-Paap first stage F statistic is 157 for each
regression in Panel A and 147 in Panel B. Results for total prefecture employment are similar to those for
population. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A: Binary Measure of Regional Prefecture Primacy
Panel B: Continuous Measure of Regional Prefecture Primacy
Log Pref Log Pref Growth Pref Log 
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Pop 1990-2010 Wage 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 2010 Market Potential -6.90 -9.58** -9.64*** -9.14**
Gravity (8.39) (4.32) (3.32) (3.95)
X Rank 1 Prefecture 22.7** 14.3*** 12.5*** 12.8**
(10.7) (4.78) (3.77) (6.42)
Log 2010 Time to Nearest -0.18** -0.11* -0.074** -0.033*
Port (0.076) (0.062) (0.034) (0.020)
X Rank 1 Prefecture 0.11 0.050 0.025 -0.039
(0.087) (0.052) (0.031) (0.034)
Rank 1 Prefecture -294** -185*** -162*** -165**
(138) (61.9) (48.8) (83.0)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.073 -0.13** -0.13*** -0.11*
   Units within 450 km (0.13) (0.061) (0.046) (0.062)
X Primate Prefecture 1.12*** 0.60*** 0.47*** 0.27
(0.29) (0.17) (0.14) (0.21)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.17** -0.098* -0.066** -0.038**
   Travel Time (0.067) (0.055) (0.029) (0.019)
X Primate Prefecture 0.18*** 0.034 0.014 -0.032
(0.055) (0.039) (0.023) (0.027)
Primate Prefecture -12.9*** -6.49*** -5.14*** -2.81
(3.07) (1.80) (1.53) (2.25)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.33* -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.20**
   Units within 300 km (0.20) (0.091) (0.073) (0.094)
X Primate Prefecture 0.52*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.25**
(0.19) (0.098) (0.082) (0.11)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.19** -0.12* -0.079** -0.034*
   Travel Time (0.076) (0.061) (0.033) (0.020)
X Primate Prefecture 0.090 0.038 0.014 -0.052*
(0.078) (0.049) (0.029) (0.031)
Primate Prefecture -5.69*** -3.21*** -2.59*** -2.30*
(2.14) (1.17) (0.90) (1.21)
Regressions in columns 1-3 have 285 observations and that in column 4 has 283 observations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4. Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Market Potential Gravity Regressions
Panel B. Distance Based Measure of Primacy
Panel C. Road Efficiency Units within 300 km
Log Pref Log Pref Pref Pop Growth Log Private Firm
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Rate 1990-2010 Wage 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.059 -0.12** -0.14*** -0.14**
Units within 450 km (0.12) (0.055) (0.045) (0.061)
X Nodal Prefecture -0.0013 0.0086 -0.011 -0.019
(0.047) (0.031) (0.021) (0.015)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.19** -0.11** -0.097** -0.069**
   Travel Time (0.085) (0.048) (0.039) (0.029)
X Nodal Prefecture 0.10 0.033 0.055 0.041
(0.090) (0.055) (0.040) (0.029)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.085 -0.15** -0.15*** -0.15**
Units within 450 km (0.13) (0.070) (0.048) (0.061)
X Large Population City -0.047 -0.049 -0.026 -0.019
(0.057) (0.044) (0.025) (0.016)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.22* -0.16* -0.10* -0.066**
   Travel Time (0.12) (0.096) (0.053) (0.029)
X Large Population City 0.15 0.11 0.068 0.055*
(0.10) (0.080) (0.045) (0.030)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.080 -0.14** -0.14*** -0.12*
Units within 450 km (0.13) (0.065) (0.048) (0.063)
X Provincial Capital 0.25 0.11 0.12* 0.098
(0.19) (0.079) (0.069) (0.13)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.20** -0.11* -0.077** -0.040*
   Travel Time (0.081) (0.067) (0.036) (0.023)
X Provincial Capital 0.15** 0.051 0.028 -0.0057
(0.070) (0.049) (0.028) (0.022)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.022 -0.11* -0.12*** -0.13**
Units within 450 km (0.13) (0.058) (0.045) (0.062)
X Non Rank 1 0.056 0.087 0.092 0.074
   Provincial Capital (0.23) (0.069) (0.066) (0.14)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.17** -0.11* -0.076** -0.039**
   Travel Time (0.070) (0.057) (0.031) (0.020)
X Non Rank 1 0.15*** 0.077** 0.056*** 0.016
   Provincial Capital (0.053) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022)
Notes: First stage F-statistics are 8.3 in Panel A, 22 in Panel B, 34.9 in Panel C and 58.5 in Panel D. Full
interactions of any of these three alternative primacy definitions with largest city within a 360 minute
drive yield first stage F-statistics that are too small for resulting regression results to be informative.
Panel D: Primacy as non Rank 1 Provincial Capitals
Table 5: Effects Using Alternative Definitions of Primacy
Panel A: Primacy as Nodal Prefecture in the 5-7 Road Plan
Panel B: Primacy as Top 10% of 1982 Center City Populations
Panel C: Primacy as Provincial Capitals
FIRE & Other
Total Agric. Manuf. Bus. Svc. Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.19** 0.38*** -0.35* -0.29** -0.043
   Units within 450 km (0.089) (0.11) (0.19) (0.14) (0.072)
X Primate Prefecture 0.34*** 0.22 0.57*** 0.41** 0.16
(0.097) (0.18) (0.22) (0.19) (0.100)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.13* 0.087** -0.24*** -0.22** -0.11**
   Travel Time (0.071) (0.038) (0.089) (0.094) (0.056)
X Primate Prefecture 0.020 0.081 0.21** 0.10 0.054
(0.056) (0.065) (0.096) (0.093) (0.053)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.41*** 0.47*** -0.69*** -0.55*** -0.17
   Units within 450 km (0.13) (0.15) (0.24) (0.19) (0.11)
X Primate Prefecture 0.54*** 0.012 0.89*** 0.58** 0.34**
(0.15) (0.21) (0.31) (0.25) (0.14)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.27** 0.14** -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.24**
   Travel Time (0.12) (0.066) (0.15) (0.15) (0.094)
X Primate Prefecture 0.27** -0.073 0.43*** 0.40** 0.23**
(0.14) (0.092) (0.16) (0.17) (0.10)
Table 6: Effects on log  Employment by Industry
Panel A: Binary Measure of Regional Prefecture Primacy
Panel B: Continuous Measure of Regional Prefecture Primacy
Notes: Each regression has the same set of control variables as in Table 2, with 285 obervations. The First stage






Full Sample 531,676 ‐538,052 0
(624,731) (396,773) (570,695)
Primate Prefectures Only ‐748,171 ‐640,686 ‐1,206,162
(694,986) (572,957) (947,008)
Non‐Primate Prefectures Only 660,154 ‐527,749 121,082
(448,526) (374,587) (332,091)
Notes: Each entry in Columns 1 and 2 shows the average 2010 prefecture population net of the indicated
roads effect minus 2010 prefecture population. Each entry in Column 3 shows the average 2010
prefecture population net of all road effects scaled to sum to 2010 prefecture population minus 2010
prefecture population. Estimates are based on the regression specification in Table 3, Column 2. Each
cell of the table reports prefecture means with standeard deviations in parentheses.
Table 7: Impacts of Downgrading Expressways on Population
Population Gains Associated with Going from 2010 to 1990 Roads Infrastructure
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency 10.72
Units within 450 km (0.40)
Log 2010 Time to Nearest 5.87
Port (1.30)
Log 2010 Market Potential gravity 12.92
(0.01)
Log Total Market Access 6.52
(0.05)
Log Domestic Market Access 6.23
(0.04)
Log External Market Access 5.13
(0.06)
Log 1962 Roads Within 9.39
450 km, Excluding Own Prefecture (0.29)
Log 1962 Time to Nearest 6.07
Port, Given Road Upgrades (1.42)
Primate  Prefecture Indicator 0.09
(Largest 1982 Pref Pop In a 360 Minute Drive) (0.29)
Notes: Each statistic is calculated for 285 observations.
Table A1: Summary Statistics
Means and (Standard Deviations)
Log Prefecture Log Prefecture Prefecture Pop Log Private Firm
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Gr. Rate 1990-2010 Wage 2007
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency 0.082 -0.077 -0.079* -0.14**
   Units within 450 km (0.13) (0.064) (0.043) (0.056)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.14** -0.098* -0.067** -0.029*
   Travel Time (0.064) (0.051) (0.028) (0.016)
Log Prefecture Area, 2005 -0.016 -0.047 -0.041 -0.075**
(0.061) (0.029) (0.026) (0.032)
Log Central City Area, 1990 -0.098* -0.031 -0.023 0.023
(0.051) (0.027) (0.017) (0.020)
Log Central City Population, 0.12** 0.025 0.026 0.018
      1982 (0.055) (0.026) (0.018) (0.029)
Log Central City Roughness -0.051 0.0015 0.0022 0.036**
(0.034) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016)
Log Prefecture roughness -0.019 0.0014 0.0043 0.012
(0.028) (0.012) (0.0095) (0.015)
Provincial Capital 0.63*** 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.17**
(0.11) (0.053) (0.038) (0.071)
Log Prefecture Population, 0.54*** 0.82*** -0.11*** 0.054
      1982 (0.087) (0.050) (0.031) (0.041)
Share Prefecture Population, 0.68 -0.13 -0.27 -0.59
   with High School, 1982 (0.95) (0.44) (0.35) (0.56)
Share Prefecture Population, 2.16*** -0.32 0.035 0.55**
   in Manufacturing, 1982 (0.57) (0.38) (0.23) (0.24)
Log km to Coast -0.034 -0.012 -0.0086 -0.014
(0.035) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
West Region -0.041 0.012 0.0077 -0.0079
(0.11) (0.042) (0.034) (0.053)
East Region 0.18** -0.041 -0.024 0.092**
(0.084) (0.046) (0.031) (0.044)
Constant -1.85 4.79*** 3.20*** 10.8***
(2.15) (1.51) (0.86) (0.75)
R-squared 0.78 0.89 0.43 0.33
Notes: Regressions are analogous to those in Table 2.
Table A2: OLS Infrastructure Regressions
Log Prefecture Log Prefecture Prefecture Pop Log Private Firm
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Gr. Rate 1990-2010 Wage 2007
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency 0.022 -0.11 -0.11** -0.19***
Units within 450 km (0.14) (0.072) (0.047) (0.061)
X Rank 1 Prefecture 0.39** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.25**
(0.18) (0.092) (0.065) (0.12)
Log 2010 Time to Nearest -0.16** -0.11* -0.072** -0.025
Port (0.073) (0.059) (0.032) (0.018)
X Rank 1 Prefecture 0.095 0.045 0.020 -0.036
(0.075) (0.046) (0.026) (0.024)
Rank 1 -4.72** -2.98** -2.41*** -2.51*
(2.15) (1.17) (0.77) (1.33)
R-squared 0.78 0.89 0.45 0.35
Notes: Regressions are analogous to those in Table 3 Panel A.
Table A3: OLS Infrastructure Regressions With Primate City Interactions
Log Prefecture Log Prefecture Prefecture Pop Gr. Log Private Firm
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Rate 1990-2010 Wage 2007
log 2010 Market access 2.88* 0.53 -0.17 -0.52
(1.60) (0.92) (0.61) (0.70)
First stage F 69.2 69.2 69.2 68.8
log 2010 Domestic -8.58* -6.63** -5.08*** -3.56**
     Market Access (4.48) (3.34) (1.84) (1.42)
log 2010 External 13.0** 8.15* 5.61** 3.47**
     Market Access (5.57) (4.49) (2.41) (1.49)
First stage F 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.5
Table A4: IV Effects of Market Potential and Market Access
Panel A: Market Access Regressions
Panel B: Market Access Regressions, Domestic and External
Notes: Each regression has the same set of control variables as in Table 2. Regressions in columns 1-3 have 285
observations and that in column 4 has 283 observations. First stage regressions use same instruments as in Table
3. Market access measures are from eqn. (6) of the Appendix. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Log Prefecture Log Prefecture Prefecture Pop Gr. Log Private Firm
GDP 2010 Pop 2010 Rate 1990-2010 Wage 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 2010 Road  Efficiency -0.049 -0.14** -0.15*** -0.15**
   Units within 450 km (0.14) (0.069) (0.050) (0.066)
X Primate Prefecture 0.50** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.24**
(0.23) (0.093) (0.065) (0.12)
Log 2010 Minimum Port -0.14* -0.097 -0.063* -0.027
   Travel Time (0.074) (0.061) (0.033) (0.020)
X Primate Prefecture 0.018 0.0095 -0.010 -0.067**
(0.080) (0.051) (0.029) (0.033)
Primate Prefecture -5.36* -3.08** -2.57*** -2.23
(2.77) (1.22) (0.79) (1.38)
1995 Special Economic Zone 0.40*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.053
(0.089) (0.043) (0.037) (0.041)
X Primate Prefecture -0.054 -0.035 -0.038 -0.052
(0.17) (0.074) (0.057) (0.11)
Table A5: Infrastructure Effects with Primate Prefecture Interactions and SEZ Controls
Notes: Each regression has the same set of control variables as in Table 2. Regressions in columns 1-3 have 285
observations and that in column 4 has 283 observations. The Kleibergen-Paap first stage F statistic is 143 for each
regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Figure 1: Geographic distributions of data. In all panels but (c) lighter colors indicate larger values.
Highlighted prefectures in panel (e) are regional centers.
(a) 1962 road network (b) 2010 road network
(c) 2010 gdp (d) 2010 population
(e) Regional primates
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Figure 2: Geographic distributions of road measures. In all panels lighter colors indicate larger
values.
(a) 2010 Efficiency roads (b) Travel time to port
(c) Market Potential (d) Market Access
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Figure 3: Determining the Number of Regional Primate Cities
(a) Travel Time Based
(b) Distance Based
Notes: Graph of χ2 test statistics comparing empirical models with primate city interactions to
those without for different definitions of primacy. Primacy is defined as (a) the highest
population prefecture within the indicated number of minutes’ drive over the 1962 road network
at 90 kph or (b) km of straight line travel. The blue line uses log 2010 GDP as the outcome and the
red line uses log 2010 population as the outcome. The green line indicates the count of primate
prefectures for each distance threshold and definition.
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Figure 4: Geographic distributions of counterfactual population changes. In both panels lighter
colors indicate larger values.
(a) Counterfactual changes in population
no regional primate effects
(b) Counterfactual changes in population
with regional primate effects
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Figure A1: Geographic distributions of components of market access. In both panels lighter colors
indicate larger values.
(a) Market Access Domestic Component (b) Market Access Trade Component
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